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PROST V. ANDERSON AND THE ENIGMATIC SAVINGS
CLAUSE OF § 2255: WHEN IS A REMEDY BY MOTION
"INADEQUATE OR INEFFECTIVE"?
INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus is a principle mechanism by which pris-
oners may collaterally challenge their convictions or sentences.' The
"Great Writ" has been a part of the American judicial system in one form
2or another since the birth of the nation. It is a right guaranteed by the
Constitution,' but one whose contours are ever-changing and ill-defined.4
The writ was first explicitly granted in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
expanded by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and statutorily revised mul-
tiple times in the twentieth century.' With every congressional revision
of the writ, courts have modulated the scope of habeas corpus review to
accommodate the perceived intent of Congress.6 As a result, the breadth
of the writ has changed over time, with periods of expansive application
and others of more restricted application.'
In the centuries that the writ has evolved, a labyrinth of procedural
complexities has evolved with it.8 The latest of these complexities in-
volves the savings clause9 of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The federal circuits are
split in regard to the proper application of this enigmatic clause. In Prost
v. Anderson,o the Tenth Circuit waded into the murky waters of savings
clause jurisprudence, and in doing so, widened an already prominent
split.
Part I of this Comment contrasts the relationship between two prin-
ciple mechanisms by which federal prisoners may bring collateral chal-
lenges: 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2241. Part I also examines the savings
clause of § 2255 and its interpretation across circuits. Part II summarizes
1. See Harvey Bartle, Comment, One Bite at the Apple: The Effect of Recharacterization on
Post-Conviction Relief Under 28 US.C. § 2255, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 613, 614 (2002).
2. Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Inno-
cence. A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted
ofNon-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 78 (2005).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
4. See Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 78.
5. Id.at78-8 1.
6. See id at 80-81; see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996) (explaining that
the original writ of habeas corpus was "quite different from that which exists today").
7. See Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 80-81.
8. Id. at 78.
9. This "savings clause," consisting of the final twenty words of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is so
termed because it may be used to validate certain petitions for relief otherwise prohibited by that
subsection.
10. 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011).
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the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Prost. Part III undertakes an analy-
sis that begins with a critique of savings clause jurisprudence and con-
cludes with a call for the Supreme Court to settle the ever-widening cir-
cuit split.
I. BACKGROUND
Federal prisoners have recourse to collaterally challenge their con-
victions and sentences through the two principle mechanisms of 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255, but each of these remedial mechanisms may
be used only in particular circumstances. The following section details
these habeas and habeas-equivalent statutes. It focuses on the courts'
struggle to properly define the scope of § 2255's savings clause, which
allows petitioners access to § 2241 when the § 2255 mechanism is
deemed "inadequate or ineffective." As explained below, the circuits
were split three ways regarding proper application of this clause even
before Prost was decided.
A. Federal Collateral Challenges
This section compares the relationship between the federal habeas
corpus statute, § 2241, and the habeas-equivalent statute of § 2255. It
begins by tracing the origins of these two statutes and concludes by de-
scribing the revisions brought about by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act.
1. The Relationship Between § 2241 and § 2255
As the Great Writ evolved, the rate at which prisoners filed habeas
corpus petitions increased enormously." Many of these petitions were
"repetitious and patently frivolous," flooding the courts with an unending
quagmire of work.12 A series of administrative difficulties compounded
the volume problem, hindering even the meritorious petitions." Chief
among these difficulties was the requirement that habeas petitions be
filed in the district of confinement rather than the sentencing district.14
This left the districts containing federal prisons with an "inordinate num-
ber of habeas corpus actions."' 5 Furthermore, many times the districts of
confinement did not have easy access to witnesses and case records, re-
sulting in further delays and backlogs.16
11. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 (1952).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Benjamin R. Orye III, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, The Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Pur-
poses of28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441,447 (2002).
15. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 213-14.
16. Orye, supra note 14, at 447-48.
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Seeking to alleviate these difficulties, Congress in 1948 enacted a
statutory alternative to habeas corpus, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255.'1
The statute was enacted to provide "a remedy exactly commensurate"
with prior habeas corpus relief, but available in the sentencing district
rather than the district of confinement.' 8 It was intended to "minimize the
difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same
rights in another and more convenient forum."l 9 The statute provides, in
pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum au-
thorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence. 20
Upon enactment, the statute became the "exclusive remedy for testing
the validity of a judgment and sentence." 2 1
In contrast to the habeas-equivalent remedy afforded by § 2255,
federal court jurisdiction over actual habeas corpus petitions is codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the descendant of the 1789 provision.2 2 Motions
pursuant to § 2241 must be brought in the district of confinement and not
the district that imposed the sentence. 23 Like § 2255, this revision of ha-
beas was also enacted in 1948, but was made available only in narrow
circumstances. 24 The statute provides:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act
of Congress, or an order, process, judgment, or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States; or
17. Stephen 1. Viadeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 990 (2011)
(book review).
18. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,427 (1962).
19. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).
21. Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Johnson v. Taylor, 347
F.2d 365, 366 (10th Cir. 1965)).
22. Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 79 (2011).
23. Story, 86 F.3d at 166.
24. See Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 81.
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(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in
custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right ...
claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state,
or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon
the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial. 25
While § 2255 is the principle collateral mechanism through which
prisoners may challenge their convictions, § 2241 remains the mecha-
nism through which prisoners may challenge the execution of a sentence
rather than its validity.26 These complaints may involve prison condi-
tions, the administration of parole, or prison disciplinary actions, among
others.27 However, it may be used only in these narrow circumstances;
prisoners cannot utilize § 2241 to challenge unlawful detentions that may
be remedied by § 2255.28
2. The AEDPA Amendments
In 1996, Congress substantially revised the federal collateral chal-
lenge statutes when it enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA).29 One of the main goals of the revisions was to
"curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus." 30 To achieve this
goal, Congress placed severe limitations on second and successive col-
lateral challenges. 3 1 Post-AEDPA, subsection (h) of § 2255 provides:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in sec-
tion 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on col-
lateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavaila-
ble.32
Before this amendment, courts were free to hear successive peti-
tions even on grounds similar to previous § 2255 motions.3 3 The prior
version only provided that courts were not required to hear second and
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2006).
26. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 83.
27. Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001).
28. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 85.
29. Id. at 87.
30. H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
31. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 87 88.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006).
33. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 88.
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successive motions.3 4 Under the revised statute, all claims presented in
prior motions must be dismissed, and new claims must fall into one of
the two "narrow exceptions."35 Thus, the AEDPA amendments "greatly
restrict[ed] the power of federal courts" to hear second and successive
collateral challenges and ushered in a new, much more restrictive era of
federal habeas corpus. 6
B. The Savings Clause
The following sections describe the savings clause of § 2255 and
the courts' inconsistent efforts to properly define it. As described below,
a majority of circuits have taken their respective turns interpreting the
clause, resulting in at least three different tests and a sharp split among
the circuits.
1. Text and Meaning
Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in subsection (h) of
§ 2255, several courts have interpreted subsection (e) as an alternative
means through which certain prisoners may bring a second or successive
collateral challenge. Subsection (e) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the rem-
edy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.37
The legislative history contains few meaningful clues regarding the true
meaning of the "inadequate or ineffective" language of this savings
clause." However, in the "extremely limited circumstances" in which a
prisoner is able to prove that the § 2255 remedy is "inadequate or inef-
fective," courts have authorized a habeas corpus petition pursuant to
§ 2241 via the savings clause, even if a prior § 2255 motion has been
denied.39
34. Id.
35. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001).
36. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1241 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (explaining that there is
nothing "in the legislative history explaining why the relevant language was changed or what the
new language means").
39. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Caravalho v. Pugh, 177
F.3d 1177, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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2. Inter-Circuit Jurisprudence
Despite the scant legislative history behind the savings clause, sev-
eral circuits have attempted to formulate a rule regarding its proper ap-
plication. These efforts have produced inconsistent results. 40 Although
the circuits are in general agreement that access to § 2241 via the savings
clause should turn on whether the petitioner has had an opportunity to
present his claim, the circuits are split as to what satisfies the requisite
"opportunity."41
a. The Second and Third Circuits' Constitutional Test
The Second and Third Circuits were among the first to interpret the
AEDPA-revised version of § 2255. Both circuits determined that the
savings clause may be available when constitutional issues would other-
wise arise.42 In each case, the courts allowed a second collateral chal-
lenge via the savings clause and § 2241 because the prisoner would have
had no other recourse to bring a claim of actual innocence.4 3 However,
neither circuit elaborated on which issues are of sufficient constitutional
dimension to trigger the savings clause.
b. The "Unobstructed Procedural Shot" Test
A number of circuits soon expanded upon the analyses of the Se-
cond and Third Circuits and adopted slightly more formulaic rules re-
garding proper application of the savings clause." Although the tests
have been articulated in slightly different ways, each involves common
ingredients of (1) actual innocence and (2) retroactivity.4 5 As the Seventh
40. See, e.g, id. at 594 (recognizing that the circuits have split "three different ways on how
best to read the savings clause").
41. See id. at 589-94 (discussing the different tests used across circuits).
42. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the unavailability of
collateral review to a party claiming innocence would raise a "thorny constitutional issue");
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the savings clause is
available when failure to provide collateral review would raise "serious constitutional questions").
43. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (holding that the savings clause applies because
Dorsainvil "does not have and . . .never had an opportunity to challenge his conviction"); Triestman,
124 F.3d at 380 (allowing resort to § 2241 because an attempt by Congress to preclude all collateral
review "would raise serious questions as to the constitutional validity of the AEDPA's amendments
to § 2255").
44. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 902-04 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying on the
analyses of its sister circuits to formulate a rule based on actual innocence and retroactivity); In re
Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the rationale of its sister circuits and
explaining its three-pronged test to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of § 2255); Wofford v.
Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1242-44 (11th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Seventh Circuit's test as "better rea-
soned" than those of the Second and Third Circuits); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611-12 (7th
Cir. 1998) (rejecting the tests of the Second and Third Circuits as "too indefinite" and instead hold-
ing that a "federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus only if he had no reasonable
opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence
because the law changed after his first 2255 motion").
45. Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 ("The standards that these courts have articulated for the
savings clause may not be framed in identical terms, but the following basic features are evident in
most formulations: actual innocence and retroactivity.").
[Vol. 89:2440
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Circuit has most succinctly put it, these circuits will allow a second or
successive collateral challenge via the savings clause and § 2241 when
the petitioner has not had an "unobstructed procedural shot" at presenting
his claim. 4 6 Circuits adopting this test have generally held the requisite
"unobstructed procedural shot" to be absent when the petitioner faced
adverse circuit or Supreme Court precedent at the time of his initial §
2255 motion, and after that motion, the relevant law changed in such a
way that the conduct for which the petitioner was convicted is no longer
- - 47criminal.
c. The Ninth Circuit's "Novelty" Test
The Ninth Circuit has endorsed an expanded version of the "unob-
structed procedural shot" test, and in doing so has adopted the most lib-
eral test to determine the applicability of the savings clause to second and
successive collateral challenges.48 Ninth Circuit courts deciding whether
a petitioner was previously afforded an "unobstructed procedural shot"
will "consider (1) whether the legal basis for the petitioner's claim did
not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255
motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petition-
er's claim after that first § 2255 motion."4 9 Thus, Ninth Circuit petition-
ers have access to § 2241 via the savings clause when they present a
novel argument based on a material change in applicable law made effec-
tive after their initial § 2255 motion.o There is no explicit requirement
that petitioners faced adverse circuit precedent at the time of the initial §
2255 motion.
Before Prost v. Anderson, the Tenth Circuit was a bystander to the
tripartite circuit split regarding proper application of the savings clause to
second and successive collateral challenges. In Prost, the court analyzed
the savings clause and its associated inter-circuit jurisprudence.
II. PROST V. ANDERSON
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1998, appellant Prost was indicted in the Eastern District of Mis-
souri for his participation in a drug trafficking operation." Prost pled
guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and two
counts of conspiring to launder proceeds derived from a drug-dealing
46. See Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609 (rejecting the petition because the prisoner's initial § 2255
motion gave him "an unobstructed procedural shot at getting his sentence vacated").
47. See, e.g., In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000).
48. See Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2008).
49. Id. at 960 (quoting Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
50. See id.
51. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011).
2012] 441
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
operation.5 2 After his conviction, Prost filed a collateral challenge pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to have his sentence vacated, citing inef-
fective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.5 4
Nearly a decade after Prost's § 2255 motion was rejected, the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States. v. Santos55 lit a potential spark
in his otherwise extinguished appeals. In Santos, the Court interpreted
the term "proceeds" in the context of an illegal lottery operation as mean-
ing "profits" rather than merely "gross receipts."56 Relying on Santos and
arguing that the funds he laundered were merely the gross receipts of the
drug-dealing operation, Prost filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking to have his money laundering convictions
overturned. The petition was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, where Prost was imprisoned, due to the re-
quirement that § 2241 petitions be brought in the district of incarcera-
tion.
The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the proper
post-conviction remedy for prisoners challenging the legality of their
detention is 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than § 2241.59 The court explained
that § 2241 is available only when the remedy provided by § 2255 is
"inadequate or ineffective."6 0 The mere fact that Prost may be barred
from bringing a second § 2255 petition did not make the remedy inade-
quate or ineffective because his argument could have been included in
the initial § 2255 proceeding.61
B. Majority Opinion
In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court decision.62 The court held that the appropriate
metric in determining § 2255's remedial adequacy in relation to second
or successive challenges is whether the petitioner's argument could have
been raised in the initial § 2255 motion.63 Because Prost could have
brought his statutory interpretation argument in his initial § 2255 pro-
52. Id.
53. Prost v. Wiley, No. 08-CV-02246-BNB, 2008 WL 4925667, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 13,
2008).
54. Prost, 636 F.3d at 580.
55. 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
56. Id. at 514.
57. Prost, 636 F.3d at 580-81.
58. Id. at 581.
59. Prost v. Wiley, No. 08-CV-02246-BNB, 2008 WL 4925667, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 13,
2008).
60. Id. at *1-2.
61. Id. at *2.
62. Prost, 636 F.3d at 598.
63. Id. at 584.
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ceeding, the court reasoned, he was barred from accessing § 2241 via the
savings clause.M
In support of its proffered metric, the majority gleaned five points
from the context, history, and precedent underlying § 2255.65 First look-
ing to the plain language of the statute, the court found that § 2255 guar-
antees petitioners an opportunity to test their arguments but does not
guarantee relief.66 So long as petitioners are afforded a remedy via an
initial motion, the court reasoned, the unavailability of a second motion
does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. 6 7 The court found fur-
ther support for its holding by looking to the savings clause's "near
neighbor," § 2255(h), which limits second or successive motions to those
68concerning newly discovered evidence or new constitutional rulings.
The absence of "new statutory interpretations" from the list, the court
reasoned, was an intentional omission by Congress, necessary to further
its goal of limiting federal collateral review. 69 Next, the court found its
holding to be in harmony with the statute as a whole, which is ripe with a
repeated "emphasis on providing a single opportunity to test argu-
ments., 70 Viewed in the context of AEDPA, § 2255 limits prisoner ac-
cess to § 2241 only in circumstances where the initial "motion was itself
inadequate or ineffective to the task of providing the petitioner with a
chance to test his sentence or conviction." 7 1 The court went on to analyze
the history of the savings clause, finding that the congressional intent
behind § 2255 was merely to alleviate the administrative burdens that
had come to hinder habeas corpus proceedings, not to give prisoners
"multiple bites at the apple." 72 Finally, the court found its decision to be
consistent with past Tenth Circuit decisions, which have "recognized the
narrowness" of the savings clause and "allowed resort to § 2241 sparing-
ly, only when an adequate or effective means of testing a § 2255 petition
was genuinely absent."73
Applying its newly adopted rule to the circumstances of Prost's
case, the majority affirmed the district court and rejected Prost's mo-
tion. 74 The court found, and Prost offered, no evidence that he was pre-
cluded from bringing a statutory interpretation argument in his initial
§ 2255 proceeding.75 The lack of relief was therefore caused by his own
64. Id at 588.
65. See id. at 584.
66. Id. at 584-85.
67. See id
68. Id at 585.
69. Id. at 585-86.
70. Id. at 587.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 587-88.
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failures rather than inadequacy or ineffectiveness of the § 2255 remedial
mechanism as required to trigger the savings clause.76
The holding foreclosed from Tenth Circuit petitioners two alterna-
tive tests gleaned from other circuits and proffered by Prost to determine
whether the savings clause may allow a second or successive collateral
challenge. 77 The court first rejected the Ninth Circuit's "novelty test,"
which allows prisoners a second collateral petition when the initial
§ 2255 proceeding ends before the Supreme Court hands down a new
and relevant statutory interpretation. 78 The court acknowledged the diffi-
culty in imagining novel arguments, yet rejected the novelty test while
reiterating that the true test lies in the procedural adequacy of the initial §
2255 motion.7 9 Had Congress intended the savings clause to embrace the
novelty test, the majority argued, it would have included "novel statutory
interpretations" within subsection (h) rather than expressly limiting it to
newly discovered evidence and new constitutional rulings.o
Secondly, the majority rejected Prost's submission that petitioners
should be allowed a second collateral challenge when the substance of
that challenge was erroneously foreclosed under circuit law at the time of
the initial § 2255 motion.8 ' The court acknowledged that circuit prece-
dent may sometimes require judges to reject otherwise meritorious ar-
guments, but deemed such a possibility the result of legal error rather
than inadequacy in the § 2255 remedial mechanism. 82 Prost was free, as
the Santos defendant was, to include a statutory interpretation argument
in his initial § 2255 motion and challenge any existing adverse circuit
precedent all the way to the Supreme Court.83 The court noted the multi-
tude of "instances where the Supreme Court has rewarded litigants who
took the trouble to challenge adverse circuit precedent" as evidence
§ 2255 is an adequate remedial mechanism even when adverse law ex-
ists. 84
The majority concluded with an acknowledgment that the savings
clause may be available to petitioners when necessary to avoid "serious
constitutional questions."85 However, because Prost declined to pursue a
constitutional argument in his motion, the court declined to rule on the
-86issue.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 595.
78. Id. at 589.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 590.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 590-91.
84. Id.




Judge Seymour agreed with the majority on the result but vehe-
mently disagreed with its rationale.87 Rather than delving into an analysis
of inter-circuit law, Judge Seymour would have limited the opinion to a
conclusion that Prost faced no adverse circuit precedent at the time of his
first motion, and thus had an "adequate and effective opportunity to test
the legality of his conviction" with his initial § 2255 motion. Thus,
reasoned Judge Seymour, the savings clause plainly did not apply, and
Prost was precluded from accessing § 2241.89
The heart of the disagreement between the majority and concur-
rence lay in the merits of the erroneous circuit foreclosure test.90 In her
concurring opinion, Judge Seymour intimated that she would accept the
erroneous circuit foreclosure test in the context of an actual innocence
claim.9' She relied on the Supreme Court's position that claims of actual
innocence are worthy of careful scrutiny, even when brought in a second
or successive collateral attack.9 2 Instead, the court entered "uncharted
territory to reject any circuit foreclosure test . . . reaching a conclusion
contrary to every other circuit that has decided this question." 93 Thus,
claimed Judge Seymour, the majority decision created a circuit split.94
The concurrence also sharply contended that the majority violated
the "cardinal principal of judicial restraint . . . [that] if it is not necessary
to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more."95 Because rejecting
the erroneous circuit foreclosure test was not necessary to reach its ulti-
mate conclusion, the court should not have done so.96 She noted that
"[s]ignificantly . . . not even the government" asked the court to reject
the circuit foreclosure test.97 Furthermore, contended Judge Seymour, the
parties did not adequately present the circuit foreclosure test.98 Thus, the
majority opinion "[flew] in the face of judicial restraint."99
III. ANALYSIS
The court in Prost v. Anderson correctly concluded that Congress
did not intend for successive collateral challenges based on relevant
87. Id. at 598-99 (Seymour, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 599.
89. See id. at 598-99.
90. See id. at 599-603.
91. See id at 601 (recognizing that "every other circuit" has reached a similar conclusion, and
the Tenth Circuit had "favorably recognized this position" in a prior decision).
92. Id. at 600-01.
93. Id. at 603.
94. Id. at 599.
95. Id (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 431 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. See id. at 602.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 603.
99. Id at 599.
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changes in statutory law to be within the purview of § 2255's savings
clause. Contrary holdings of other circuits have relied on an incomplete
reading of the savings clause and the subsection in which it resides. To
alleviate the tripartite circuit split that has developed around this enig-
matic clause, the Supreme Court must step-in and overturn fifteen years
of erroneous savings clause jurisprudence across circuits.
A. Spirit and Purpose of the Current § 2255
Although Congress has provided few meaningful clues regarding
the intended application of the savings clause, the Tenth Circuit's analy-
sis is consistent with the history and context of § 2255 as a whole. The
language of the statute, both in what it does and does not state, leaves
little doubt that petitioners may reach the savings clause only in the nar-
rowest of circumstances. The restrictions placed on second and succes-
sive collateral challenges ensure that courts are not encumbered by the
administrative problems that led to § 2255's initial enactment and played
a role in the AEDPA amendments. In Prost, the Tenth Circuit correctly
analyzed the post-AEDPA statute as Congress intended it to apply. Its
reading conforms to the legislative intent from both a textual and practi-
cal standpoint.
1. AEDPA's Dramatic Changes
A comparison of the pre-AEDPA and post-AEDPA statutory lan-
guage illustrates that Congress intended the amendments to dramatically
limit second and successive collateral challenges. Before the AEDPA
amendments, § 2255 provided that courts "shall not be required to enter-
tain a second or successive motion for similar relief [on] behalf of the
same prisoner."100 The equivocal language of the statute lent substantial
deference to the judgment of courts. Even more, the wording of the stat-
ute in its previous form indicated that Congress's intended default at that
time was to allow second and successive collateral challenges on all po-
tentially meritorious grounds. This intention was recognized and carried
out by the courts. 0' In essence, the prior version of the statute created an
open pathway for second and successive motions that could be closed at
the discretion of the court, but, by default, would remain open. The draft-
ers could have easily avoided this result if they had simply instructed that
courts "may" hear second and successive challenges. This unchosen for-
mulation would have closed the door to such challenges but given courts
the power to open the door when justice so required. The "may" modifier
would have acted as justifiable cause for hearing motions that would, in
100. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 368 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1996)).
101. See, e.g., id. (explaining that second or successive collateral challenges brought under the
pre-AEDPA version of § 2255 should be heard "where the ends of justice would ... be served by
reaching the merits of the subsequent application." (quoting Barton v. United States, 791 F.3d 265,
266-67 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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normal circumstances, be denied. Instead, Congress drafted the previous
version of § 2255 in a way that allowed courts to liberally hear second
and successive collateral challenges.
With the AEDPA amendments, Congress dramatically altered the
circumstances in which courts may hear second or successive collateral
motions. In sharp contrast to the open-ended language of the previous
statute, Congress directed courts to specific and exclusive instances in
which such challenges may be heard. The statute now provides:
A second or successive motion must be certified in section 2244 by a
panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on col-
lateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavaila-
ble.102
The revised statutory language leaves little doubt that Congress in-
tended to allow second and successive collateral petitions only in the
most extraordinary of circumstances. Deference to the courts was largely
eliminated. Petitioners meeting neither of the two narrow criteria denoted
by Congress were limited to one, and only one, bite at the apple.
Nonetheless, some courts have re-captured a portion of that defer-
ence by way of the savings clause and its "inadequate or ineffective"
language. By allowing access to § 2241 via the savings clause, courts
have created alternative circumstances in which second and successive
collateral challenges may be heard. But this may be more latitude than
Congress intended. The entirety of the subsection in which the "inade-
quate or ineffective" language resides is as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the reme-
dy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his de-
-103tention.
Two issues relating to this subsection cast doubt over courts' reli-
ance on it to allow second and successive challenges. First, the savings
clause is prefaced with the restriction that it applies only to "a prisoner
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2008).
103. § 2255(e) (2008) (emphasis added).
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who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section."
By the very restrictions contained in the statute, a prisoner who has al-
ready brought a § 2255 motion is not authorized to bring a subsequent
motion. Rather, the petitioner must appeal to a panel of the court of ap-
peals, which will then issue an order to "grant or deny the authoriza-
tion."'" The authorization will be granted only if there is a prima facie
showing that the application contains newly discovered evidence or a
new constitutional rule. 05 Therefore, utilizing the savings clause to allow
unauthorized successive petitions involves a circularity that contradicts
the plain language of the statute. The savings clause is impliedly being
used to authorize petitions that are otherwise unauthorized and outside its
reach. This cannot be what Congress intended. More likely, Congress
included the savings clause as a resort to § 2241 when the initial § 2255
motion is inadequate or ineffective, as when a military prisoner seeks to
challenge the result of a court martial that has since dissolved.'0 6 In these
circumstances, the petitioner is "authorized to apply for relief pursuant
to" § 2255, and the savings clause rightfully applies.
The placement of the savings clause in relation to the entirety of
§ 2255 also casts doubt over its use as an alternative mechanism by
which petitioners may bring a second or successive collateral challenge.
The savings clause resides in subsection (e) of § 2255, while the re-
striction on successive challenges is found in subsection (h). It seems
illogical that Congress would provide the exception before announcing
the rule. Congress could have just as easily, and with much less resulting
confusion, included the savings clause (or a duplicate thereof) within
subsection (h) if it intended for successive challenges to be within its
purview. Instead, Congress likely constructed the statute in its amended
form because it never intended to make the savings clause a back-door
escape from the restrictions on second and successive challenges.
2. The Choice to Omit Statutory Interpretations
As discussed above, the AEDPA-revised version of § 2255 allows
courts to hear second and successive collateral challenges only when
they pertain to newly discovered evidence or new constitutional rulings.
New statutory interpretations, like the one at issue in Prost, are conspic-
uously absent from this short list of allowable challenges. Thus, to square
the argument that the revised § 2255 allows for secondary collateral chal-
lenges in situations similar to Prost, one must first accept that Congress
chose to relegate changes in statutory law to the catch-all savings clause
rather than explicitly provide for them in subsection (h). Even setting
aside the contrary evidence discussed in the prior section, this is a diffi-
cult argument to accept. Congress is undoubtedly aware that it is the
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) (2006).
105. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
106. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011).
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courts' duty to interpret ambiguous statutes and that, as in Santos, the
Supreme Court will sometimes effect a change in law. Indeed, it pur-
posefully included the "constitutional" modifier rather than generically
allowing any "new rule of law" to trigger a second or successive chal-
lenge. The choice to omit changes in statutory law from the grace of sub-
section (h) is thus more likely an intentional act by Congress that should
be recognized by the courts.
But the question remains: why would Congress choose to intention-
ally deny secondary collateral challenges pertaining to relevant changes
in law, creating situations where prisoners may remain in jail for crimes
the Supreme Court has deemed non-existent? One likely reason involves
the indefinite nature of statutory law and the language upon which it is
composed. Unlike the supremacy of constitutional law and the definite
nature of DNA testing and other forms of newly discovered evidence,
statutory interpretations are amorphous and constantly evolving. The
circumstances surrounding Prost perfectly illustrate this point. While
defining the term "proceeds" in Santos, the Supreme Court recognized
the "inherent ambiguity" of the word, which Congress has sometimes
intended to mean "profits" and sometimes "receipts." 07 After failing to
find a definitive answer in the legislative history underlying the statute,
the Court, in a plurality opinion, based its decision on the rule of leni-
ty 0 8 But not long after the decision, Congress deemed the Santos plural-
ity's definition inaccurate and amended the statute's meaning of "pro-
ceeds" to specifically include "gross receipts."' 0 9
Notwithstanding the speed at which Congress moved to correct the
Court's erroneous interpretation, Prost and similar cases still fell under
the previous version of the statute, the Santos decision, and the incorrect
definition of "proceeds."" 0 One must pause to consider the ultimate re-
sult of Prost had Congress included statutory interpretation arguments
within the purview of the savings clause: after admitting to, being con-
victed of, and exhausting all other available appeals for his role in the
drug trafficking and money laundering scheme, Prost likely would have
been exonerated by a short-lived and erroneous interpretation of the word
"proceeds." Congress presumably deemed such results unacceptable and
crafted the revised § 2255 in a way that prevents opportunistic criminals
from gaining a fortuitous and unwarranted escape from their criminal
conduct.
107. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511-12, 514 (2008) (explaining that, when a statute
may reasonably be interpreted in two different ways, the "tie must go to the defendant").
108. Id. at 514. ("The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed in
favor of the defendant."); see also Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2055 (2011).
109. Prost, 636 F.3d at 580 n.1.
110. Id.
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B. Propagation ofError Across Circuits
Without exception, the circuits have ignored the textual evidence
that Congress intended second and successive collateral challenges to be
wholly outside the purview of the savings clause while focusing on the
circumstances in which § 2255 might be "inadequate or ineffective" in
relation to such challenges. This fatal error originated concurrently in the
Second and Third Circuits soon after the AEDPA amendments were en-
acted. Masked by the otherwise thorough and logical holdings of these
decisions, the error gradually infiltrated the law of other circuits as those
courts looked to helpful precedent when faced with the same issue. This
error is a main cause of the state of savings clause jurisprudence today: a
sharp split between circuits centered around the meaning of "inadequate
and ineffective" that ignores the remainder of the subsection. To alleviate
the split, the original error must be confronted and corrected.
1. An Incomplete Reading of the Savings Clause
Shortly after the § 2255 AEDPA amendments were enacted, the Se-
cond Circuit decided Triestman v. United States,"' and the Third Circuit
decided In re Dorsainvil.1 12 The issue in both cases, as in Prost, was
whether § 2255 allows a petitioner a secondary collateral challenge after
a relevant change in law.' 13 A number of other circuits had confronted
precisely the same issue, but limited their holdings to denial of the sec-
ondary collateral challenge because the change in law was not of consti-
tutional dimension as required by § 2255(h).'1 4 The Second and Third
Circuits went further, and in doing so became the first courts to consider
whether the savings clause might afford petitioners a second or succes-
sive collateral challenge. 15
The majority in Triestman held that petitioners may access the sav-
ings clause when § 2255 is unavailable and the failure to provide collat-
eral review would "raise serious constitutional questions." 1 l6 Although
this test may very well be the correct criteria by which to apply the sav-
ings clause, the court based its holding, in part, on an incomplete reading
of the statute. By focusing exclusively on the final twenty words of sub-
section (e), in which the "inadequate or ineffective" language resides, the
court erroneously extended access to the savings clause to any prisoner.
The court failed to recognize that the savings clause is explicitly limited
to prisoners who are "authorized to apply for relief pursuant" to
§ 2255.117
111. 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997).
112. 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997).
113. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 363; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 246.
114. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 369.
115. See id. at 370.
116. Id. at 377.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2008) (emphasis added).
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As the Second Circuit considered the Triestman case, the Third Cir-
cuit analyzed precisely the same issue in Dorsainvil.18 There, the court
opined that it would face "a thorny constitutional issue" if a prisoner
claiming innocence based on a relevant change in law was left with no
judicial recourse.' 19 The court reasoned that these potential constitutional
issues could be avoided by resort to the § 2255 savings clause. 12 0 Like
the Second Circuit did in Triestman, the court reached its conclusion by
focusing exclusively on the final clause in subsection (e) while complete-
ly ignoring its explicit limitation to authorized prisoners.' 2 1
The courts in both Triestman and Dorsainvil began their analyses
by concluding that the respective petitioners met neither of the two crite-
na denoted in subsection (h), thereby indirectly recognizing that the peti-
tioners were not authorized to bring a second § 2255 motion.122 By the
plain language of subsection (e), this would preclude the petitioners from
accessing the savings clause. But the courts failed to connect the dots.
Instead, their holdings laid the foundation for fifteen years of erroneous
savings clause jurisprudence.
2. Cause and Effect
The incomplete reading of the Second and Third Circuits appears to
have been caused by their overreliance on prior Supreme Court decisions
that analyzed the pre-AEDPA version of § 2255. Both Triestman and
Dorsainvil extensively cite Hayman 23 and Davis,'24 two Supreme Court
cases that analyzed the savings clause in its pre-AEDPA form. For ex-
ample, the Triestman Court found it "highly significant that the [Su-
preme] Court noted that, because of the habeas-preserving language of
§ 2255, it did not need to, and so would not, reach the constitutional is-
sues presented to it."l 25 But at the time Hayman was decided, § 2255
contained no restrictions on second and successive challenges, and thus
the "habeas-preserving language," i.e. the savings clause, was available
in a much greater capacity. The court also relied on Davis to suggest that
"both habeas and § 2255 had always been available" to petitioners faced
with an intervening change in law.' 26 That may very well have been true
before 1996. But the post-AEDPA statute contains first-of-its-kind re-
strictions on second and successive collateral challenges, rendering the
118. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 370 n.10.
119. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 248.
120. See id. at 251.
121. See id. at 249-52.
122. Id. at 248 ("Dorsainvil has failed to satisfy either prong of § 2255 as amended.");
Triestman, 124 F.3d at 371 ("Triestman does not appear to have shown the existence of newly dis-
covered evidence or of a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to his case . . .
123. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
124. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
125. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 378 n.20 (2d Cir. 1997).
126. Id. at 374.
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Triestman court's reliance on decades-old rationale misleading and erro-
neous.
The Dorsainvil court erred in a similar way. It analogized to Davis
and reasoned that, because the circumstances of the two cases were sub-
stantially similar, "[t]here is no reason why § 2241 would not be availa-
ble." 27 However, although the facts of the cases may have been similar,
the statutes under which the cases were analyzed were significantly dif-
ferent. Thus, the court plucked an analysis of the savings clause conduct-
ed in one era of the statute and inserted that rationale into an entirely
different era. But the statute, by then, had dramatically changed. The
rationale used by the Supreme Court before the AEDPA is no longer
compatible with the modem version of § 2255 and the savings clause.
In the years since the Second and Third Circuits put forth their in-
complete readings of the savings clause, their error has propagated
throughout the circuits. Shortly after Triestman and Dorsainvil were de-
cided, the Seventh Circuit entered the fray and analyzed the savings
clause under similar facts.128 There, the court cited both Triestman and
Dorsainvil in interpreting the "inadequate or ineffective" language.12 9
Unlike its sister circuits, the Davenport court acknowledged subsection
(e)'s limitation to authorized petitioners but dismissed this language as
referring to all federal prisoners.130 This explanation is plausible if the
"authorized" modifier was meant to differentiate § 2255 from § 2254, its
companion statute for state prisoners. But the contradiction in the stat-
ute's plain language was still either ignored or not recognized. Federal
prisoners bringing second and successive collateral challenges not per-
taining to new evidence or constitutional rules are, by the statute's own
restrictions, not authorized to do so.
From there, the decisions in Triestman, Dorsainvil, and Davenport
spread to other circuits. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits all for-
mulated rules pertaining to the savings clause based, at least in part, on
an analysis of these prior cases.'31 Regardless of whether this incomplete
reading has been a simple oversight or an intentional re-scoping of the
savings clause, the result is contrary to the plain language of the statute.
Indeed, in its Triestman holding, the Second Circuit acknowledged the
"cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that courts must give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." 32 But in the years
since the incomplete reading was first put forth, no court has done pre-
127. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.
128. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1998).
129. Seeid at 610-11.
130. Id. at 608.
131. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000); Reyes-Requena v. United States,
243 F.3d 893, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2001); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1242-44 (11 th Cir. 1999).
132. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 375 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cisely that. In all likelihood, the error will continue to propagate unless
and until the Supreme Court steps in to quash it.
C. The Supreme Court's Time
As the majority pointed out in Prost, the Tenth Circuit's decision
was the latest in an "already messy field" of savings clause jurispru-
dence.13 3 The Supreme Court should capitalize on this opportunity to
clean up the mess and resolve the circuit split. If it does so, it must ad-
dress three lingering issues. First, it must decide whether petitions lack-
ing constitutional arguments and newly discovered evidence are within
the purview of the savings clause. Second, it must determine the proper
breadth of the savings clause's "inadequate or ineffective" language.
Third, depending on its analysis of these first two issues, the Court
should address the constitutionality of the AEDPA's severe limitations
on second and successive collateral challenges.
1. Whether Otherwise Unauthorized Petitions May Properly Be
Heard Via the Savings Clause and § 2241
As discussed above, subsection (e) of § 2255 begins with the quali-
fication that it applies only to petitioners "authorized to apply for relief."
If the Supreme Court reads the entirety of this subsection literally, there-
by precluding application of the savings clause to non-authorized second
and successive petitions, the lower courts' years of savings clause juris-
prudence will have been an exercise in futility. The Court may very well
settle the circuit split by concluding that all circuits thus far have been
wrong: the savings clause is not applicable to second and successive col-
lateral challenges that do not pertain to new constitutional rules or newly
discovered evidence because, by the plain language of the statute, those
challenges are not authorized to be saved.
However, the Court may avoid this result by concluding, like the
Seventh Circuit did in Davenport, that the preamble to the savings clause
was only meant to differentiate between federal and state prisoners. 134
Although this interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the stat-
ute, the Court could get around the issue by declaring the language am-
biguous. Depending on its analysis of the constitutionality of successor
limits, the Court may reach this result. If an unconstitutional reading of
the statute can be avoided by construing the phrase "prisoner who is au-
thorized" to refer simply to federal rather than state prisoners, the Court
may do just that. 35
133. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 594 (10th Cir. 2011).
134. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1998).
135. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 n. 11 (1977) (discussing the "cardinal
principle" of statutory construction that the "Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided").
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But this is an improper course. The canons of statutory construction
should not be used as justification for judicial statutory re-construction.
When, as here, a statute plainly says one thing, the Court must read it
that way, regardless of potential constitutional conflict. Failure to do so
would violate the separation of powers and make the Court de facto
drafters of legislation.
2. Under What Circumstances Is § 2255 Inadequate or Ineffective
to Test the Legality of a Prisoner's Detention?
The Supreme Court should rule on the proper application of the sav-
ings clause regardless of how it decides the first issue. If the Court inter-
prets the plain language of the statute as advocated above, it could con-
ceivably skip to the constitutionality of that interpretation and wholly
avoid this issue. But post-AEDPA savings clause jurisprudence has fo-
cused almost solely on the proper interpretation of the savings clause,
and the Court's failure to address the issue would leave a cloud of uncer-
tainty hanging over the circuit courts.
The circuits are in general agreement that the proper test involves
whether the petitioner has had an unobstructed procedural shot at pre-
senting his claim, or as the Tenth Circuit put it, whether the petitioner
could have presented his claim in a prior § 2255 motion. The Court
should affirm this test as proper. In doing so, the Court should
acknowledge that petitioners can bring unobstructed statutory interpreta-
tion arguments in initial § 2255 motions regardless of established law at
the time of those proceedings. The nature of statutory interpretation re-
quires that someone present the argument before the courts can define the
law. If petitioners were in fact precluded from presenting these argu-
ments, Congress would have exclusive ability to modify the law. As ex-
emplified by Santos, Bailey,136 and others, this is not the case. Petitioners
may challenge any aspect or interpretation of a statute, regardless of pre-
existing law. Hence, the successor limits of subsection (h), paired with
the "authorized petitioner" preface to the savings clause, do not establish
an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Congress undoubtedly recognized this fact when structuring the
AEDPA amendments to § 2255, and structured the statute in such a way
to preclude statutory interpretation arguments from second and succes-
sive collateral petitions. Harshness aside, that is the prerogative of Con-
gress. However, whether such a construction violates any principles em-
bodied in the constitution is another matter. And it is the prerogative of
the Court to decide this question.
136. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
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3. Whether the Unavailability of Collateral Review to Prisoners
Confined for Actions Subsequently Deemed Non-Criminal Ren-
ders § 2255 Unconstitutional
Regardless of the textual evidence provided by Congress that the
savings clause was not intended to apply to second and successive collat-
eral challenges, such a construction may conflict with the constitution.
Thus far, lower courts have made a presumption of constitutionality
based upon Supreme Court decisions that found § 2255 to be constitu-
tional due, in part, to the saving function of the "inadequate or ineffec-
tive" language. 37 As a result, a focus has been placed on proper applica-
tion of the savings clause, while the constitutional questions inherent in
its availability have been examined only superficially. 3 8 But the reliance
on pre-AEDPA decisions like Hayman is misplaced. In those decisions,
the Court held that the savings clause avoided any potential constitution-
al issues that might have otherwise existed with the pre-AEDPA version
of § 2255. The AEDPA amendments dramatically altered both § 2255 as
a whole and the savings clause's function in it. The Court must therefore
determine whether the post-AEDPA statute is unconstitutional if it finds
that the savings clause does not apply to second and successive collateral
challenges based upon either of the two issues discussed above.
The resolution of this issue should coincide closely with the Court's
holding in respect to the second issue above. If the Court holds, as advo-
cated above, that petitioners are unobstructed from presenting arguments
contrary to established law with an initial § 2255 motion, the statute
should necessarily be found constitutional. The multiple layers of direct
and collateral review upon which the judicial system is structured guar-
antee petitioners an opportunity to present all arguments they deem po-
tentially meritorious. The constitution guarantees no more.13 9 The onus is
on petitioners to find and put forth those arguments.
If, however, the Court finds that (1) § 2255 as amended by the
AEDPA prohibits successive challenges based on changes in non-
constitutional law, and (2) that such petitioners have not had an unob-
structed procedural shot at presenting the claim, it must strike the statute
down as unconstitutional. The implications of such a finding would mean
that petitioners, having exhausted their sole § 2255 motion, would re-
main incarcerated for non-existent crimes without judicial recourse
through no fault of their own. Although the Supreme Court generally
137. See, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-50 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis of the savings clause in United States v. Hayman and Swain v. Pressley).
138. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 593-94 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing the constitu-
tional issues, but "declin[ing] to pursue [them] in this particular case").
139. See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 ("All the Constitution requires, if it requires




lends deference to Congress in controlling the scope of habeas corpus,
it must intervene if it finds these two conditions satisfied.
CONCLUSION
When § 2255 proves to be an inadequate or ineffective mechanism
by which petitioners may collaterally challenge their convictions and
sentences, its savings clause allows petitioners resort to the habeas relief
afforded by § 2241. However, the textual evidence provided by Congress
casts a dark shadow over courts' reliance on this savings clause to allow
second and successive collateral petitions. In Prost v. Anderson, the
Tenth Circuit reached the correct result, even if its analysis was incom-
plete. It is now up to the Supreme Court to settle the circuit split and de-
cide whether the savings clause is applicable to second and successive
collateral challenges, and if not, whether § 2255's prohibition on such
challenges conflicts with the Constitution.
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140. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
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